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CONDUCT OF PRISON OFFICIALS-APPLICATION

THE CIVIL RIGHTS

OF

AcT-Williams v. Field, 416 F.2d 483 (9th Cir.

1969).
Williams, a prisoner in a state penal institution, brought suit
against prison officials, alleging violation of his constitutional rights.'
While imprisoned, plaintiff lodged a complaint with defendants, prison
authorities, concerning a threat made against his life by a fellow inmate. Despite an interview in which the inmate stated "You had better
lock him up because I am going to get him," 2 defendants failed to
take any precautionary measures. The following day the inmate threw
a pitcher of scalding coffee into plaintiff's face and severely beat him
with the pot.
The appellate court affirmed the holding of the lower court in dismissing the complaint on the ground that mere negligence, standing
alone, is insufficient to state a claim under the Civil Rights Act.8 However, the court indicated that in appropriate circumstances actions
short of intentional conduct could support a claim under the Act if a
"bad faith oppressive motive" could be shown.
At common law, there was a duty imposed upon prison officials to
exercise reasonable care under the circumstances to protect a prisoner
from a known danger or a reasonably foreseeable hazard. In Lamb v.
Clark,4 the court held that it is a jailer's duty to exercise ordinary care
in preventing unlawful injury to prisoners while in his custody. Some
states have adhered to this proposition by enacting statutes imposing
liability on prison officials who fail to exercise reasonable care over
inmates.5 On the federal level, the duty of care is also fixed by statute.8
It provides that:
1 Plaintiff alleged that he was denied protection from injury in violation of the cruel

and unusual punishment provisions of the eighth amendment via the equal protection
and due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.

2 Williams v. Field, 416 F.2d 483, 484 (9th Cir. 1969).
3 The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 17 Stat. 13, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
4 282 Ky. 167, 169, 138 S.W.2d 350, 352 (Ct. App. 1940); accord, Coffin v. Reichard,
143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944), which held that a prisoner is not denied his right to
personal security against unlawful invasion. For discussion of jailer's liability for injury
to prisoners see Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 353 (1950). See also Travis v. Pinto, 87 N.J. Super.
263, 208 A.2d 828 (L. Div. 1965), which recognizes a distinction between ministerial and
discretionary acts in imposing liability on prison officials for negligence. The court held
that to impose liability for a discretionary act one must show malice or an evil purpose.
However, where the duty is absolute, certain, and ministerial, simple negligence is sufficient
to establish liability.
5 O'Dell v. Goodsell, 149 Neb. 261, 264, 30 N.W.2d 906, 909 (1948); accord, Smith v.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1: 243

The Bureau of Prisons, under the direction of the Attorney General, shall .. . provide for the protection, instruction, and discipline
of all persons charged with or convicted of offenses against the
United States ...
In addition, prisoners in federal penal institutions are generally permitted to sue either the United States or individual jailers under the
7
Federal Tort Claims Act.
The question of an inmate's right of action against prison authorities for deprivation of constitutional rights arose after the enactment
of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This section provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
The myriad cases dealing with this Act have raised questions regarding the specific kinds of harm against which it protects and the
8
scope of the harm which will be compensated. Screws v. United States
was the first case to shed light upon the scope of the harm by clarifying
the concept "under color of law." Until Screws, "under color of law"
had generally been limited to abridgements of federally protected
rights, privileges, and immunities by actions of state officials pursuant to state law. Screws decided that "under color of law" could apply
to either a federal or state officer acting "under color" of either a federal
or state law. The Supreme Court said:
The statute does not come into play merely because the federal law
or the state law under which the officer purports to act is violated.
It is applicable when.., someone is deprived of a federal right by
that action. 9
Monroe v. PapeO dealt specifically with the Statute. Like Screws,
Miller, 241 Iowa 625, 626, 40 N.W.2d 597, 598 (1950), which stated that aside from
statutory requirements liability would still be imposed for negligent action by the sheriff.
6 62 Stat. 849, 18 U.S.C. § 4042 (1969).
7 Winston v. United States, 305 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1962), aff'd sub nom., United States
v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963); see also Rayonier Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315 (1957);
this is the leading case on the purpose, scope, and application of the Federal Tort Claims
Act. Contra, Jones v. United States, 249 F.2d 864 (7th Cir. 1957).
8 325 U.S. 91 (1945), this case dealt with the imposition of a criminal penalty for
the wilful deprivation, "under color of law," of any rights, privileges or immunities secured
or protected by the Constitution of the United States.
9 Id. at 108.
10 365 U.S. 167 (1961).

1970]

NO TES

it too rejected the proposition that "under color of law" included only
action taken by officials pursuant to state law. The purpose of the
Statute, said the Court, was to provide a supplemental remedy to state
law by affording a federal right in federal courts because of the fear
that prejudice, passion, or neglect might prevent the proper enforcement of state laws." Moreover, Monroe enlarged the scope of the damage remedy created in the Act by applying the Screws principle to the
field of civil litigation. The remedial reach of the Act now embraces
tortious conduct violative of an individual's civil rights even though
actionable under state law. In a most dramatic statement, the Court
ruled that allegation of a purpose or specific intent to discriminate or
deprive one of a constitutional right is not essential to the statement
of a claim predicated on the Statute. Every person is to be judged by the
"natural consequences" of his actions. In effect, a new type of tort came
into existence-the invasion, "under color of law," of a citizen's con12
stitutional rights.
Where police officials are concerned, complaints under the Act
have withstood motions to dismiss if there was a direct infringement by
the police of another's constitutionally protected rights. In Hughes v.
Noble,'8 the court recognized a valid claim under the Statute where
the plaintiff was jailed without just cause or provocation for thirteen
hours. During this time he was neither permitted to call anyone nor
medically treated for injuries he had received. Similarly, the court in
Cohen v. Norris14 held that there was a bona fide complaint where
five police officers allegedly subjected plaintiff to unreasonable searches
15
and seizures.
Since Monroe, the concept of the "constitutional tort" has followed
an abstruse but interesting pattern. This is particularly true with respect to the liability of prison officials to inmates. A sizable number of
lower court cases subsequent to Monroe have permitted complaints
based on physical violence and abuse perpetrated by prison guards and
administrators on prisoners. In Brown v. Brown,18 and Wiltsie v.
11 Id. at 180.
12 Id. at 187, the proposition as to the immateriality of specific intent has gained
widespread approval; see Roberts v. Trapnell, 213 F. Supp. 49 (E.D. Pa. 1962); Selico v.
Jackson, 201 F. Supp. 475 (S.D. Cal. 1962).
13 295 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1961).
14 300 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1962).
15 Plaintiff alleged four overt acts in his complaint. They consisted generally of
warrantless searches and seizures without probable cause, committed in the presence of
others in order to humiliate him, and with an intent to inflict injury by striking him in
his private parts.
16 368 F.2d 992 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 US. 868 (1966).
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CaliforniaDepartment of Corrections,'7 the convicts alleged that their
constitutional rights were violated by prison officials who had beaten
them. In Brown, the court said that the Federal Civil Rights Act
created a cause of action to remedy deprivations of constitutional rights
by persons acting "under color of law" and that persons confined in
8
state prisons are within the protective cloak of this Statute.
A particularly fertile field of litigation involves the question of a
prisoner's right to practice his religion. If the inmate alleges clearly
discriminatory acts by his keepers the trend of cases indicate that his
complaint will be upheld against a motion to dismiss. In Williford v.
People of California, 9 the court denied a motion to dismiss the complaint in which plaintiff alleged that he had been systematically harassed
as a Black Muslim by unwarranted solitary confinement. In Cooper v.
Pate,20 the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's action in sustaining a motion to dismiss and decided that the complaint, alleging defendant's refusal to allow plaintiff to purchase certain religious publications due to his religious beliefs, was well grounded.
The versatility of the Act is demonstrated by its use and attempted
use in cases dealing with alleged negligence of prison officials in withholding and administering medical treatment. In this particular area
no hard and fast rule has been laid down. Complaints were dismissed
in Snow v. Gladden2 ' and United States ex rel. Gittlemacker v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.22 In Snow, the court dismissed the complaint even though it alleged that the prisoner suffered physical pain
and mental anguish due to the refusal of prison officials to continue an
ulcer diet for him. The complaint was also dismissed in Gittlemacker
where it alleged improper medical treatment. The rationale appears
to have been that it failed to establish an invasion of rights guaranteed
by the Federal Constitution. A case similar to Snow but reaching an
opposite conclusion is Redding v. Pate.23 There, the inmate's allegations, that he was an epileptic who suffered intense daily headaches for
which he received inadequate treatment, were held sufficient to state a
claim under the Statute. A valid claim was also recognized in Edwards
v. Duncan,24 where the convict alleged that he suffered from a heart
17 406 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1968).

18 368 F.2d at 993.

19 352 F.2d 474 (9th Cir. 1965).
20 378 U.S. 546 (1964).

21 338
22 281
23 220
24 355

F.2d 999
F. Supp.
F. Supp.
F.2d 993

(9th Cir.
175 (E.D.
124 (N.D.
(4th Cir.

1964).
Pa. 1968), aff'd, 413 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1969).
111. 1963).
1966).
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condition and was deprived of medical care even though he had officially complained. The deprivation of reasonable medical care, the
court said, is neither a necessary nor a reasonable concomitant of im25
prisonment and hence judicial review is permitted.
Typical of the overall ambiguity in this area is the protection accorded a prisoner's freedom of communication, particularly where it
involves access to the courts. In Weller v. Dickson,26 relief was denied
two prisoners who alleged that they were rejected timely access to the
courts because the prison authorities refused to type and mail legal
documents on the day they requested. In Smart v. Heinze,27 the court
dismissed a complaint which alleged that the resident notary public
refused to notarize the plaintiff's petition for habeas corpus on the
ground that it was not prepared on forms required by district court
rules. On the other hand, in Edwards v. Duncan,28 the court denied
a motion to dismiss where the prisoner alleged that prison administrators employed pressure tactics to force him to withdraw a suit against
them and seized his legal papers in connection with that suit. And in
2 9 the complaint
DeWitt v. Pail,
was also sustained where it alleged that
prison officials, as a disciplinary measure, had confiscated legal papers
necessary to the prisoner's appeal. This sanction was imposed because
the prisoner was purportedly assisting his fellow inmates with legal
problems.
If there is any similarity in the preceding cases, it is that where
prison officials directly act upon prisoners in such a way as to "shock
one's conscience" and deprive them of their constitutional rights, a
cause of action will lie under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This conclusion finds
support in United States ex rel. Knight v. Ragen, 30 where the court

said that internal matters in state penitentiaries are the sole concern
of the States, and the federal courts will not inquire concerning them
except where unusual or extraordinarycircumstances are shownA1 (Em-

phasis added). It seems, therefore, that in a prison setting, some type
of intentional conduct or motive to discriminate must be alleged in
order for a claim to be stated tinder the Statute. Such a proposition,
however, is dangerously close to conflicting with the rule that a purpose
Id.
314
27 347
28 355
29 366
30 337

at 994.
F.2d 598
F.2d 114
F.2d 993
F.2d 682
F.2d 425

31 Id.

at 426.

25

26

(9th
(9th
(4th
(9th
(7th

Cir.
Cir.
Cir.
Cir.
Cir.

1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 845 (1963).
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 896 (1965).
1966).
1966).
1964), cerlt. denied, 380 U.S. 985 (1965).
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to discriminate or deprive one of his constitutional rights is not re32
quired to state a claim under the Act.
The weight of authority supports the proposition that an unintentional common law tort, or mere negligence, standing alone, by a prison
official acting "under color of law," cannot support a claim for deprivation of a prisoner's constitutional rights. Accordingly, the court in
Gittlemacker said that "[t]ortious conduct, in and of itself, is not sufficient to establish [an] invasion of rights guaranteed by the federal
constitution.

83

From the foregoing it would seem that a complaint alleging anything short of an intentional tort would ordinarily be defeated by a
motion to dismiss. However, this somewhat rigid rule is enlarged by
Huey v. Barloga,3 4 in which the court held that the invasion of one's
federally protected rights need not be intentional, but only negligent.
Though the court employed the phrase "merely negligent," it appears
to have expounded a broader rule than the facts of the case warrant.3 5
In Huey, a Black college student seeking employment in Cicero,
Illinois, was beaten to death by a group of at least four white youths.
At this time, Cicero was experiencing racial tensions and the very
presence of Blacks on the public streets constituted a hazard to their
personal safety. It can be reasonably inferred, therefore, that the inaction of the police under these circumstances amounted to something
more than simple negligence. Thus, Huey's holding would more properly appear to be that negligent conduct, in the appropriate circumstances, will support an action under the Act. The real obscurity, then,
as to whether allegations in a complaint state a valid claim under the
Statute seems to lie somewhere between the delimiting boundaries of
intentional, outrageous conduct and merely negligent conduct.
The effect of Huey upon the inmate-jailer relationship remained
unsettled until Williams v. Field. The "bad faith oppressive motive"
test proffered by the Williams court seems to follow Huey and prescribes the standard needed to clarify the nebulous area between intentional and unintentional conduct. Nevertheless, the' application of
this standard by the court in Williams has the effect of repudiating
Huey and following the direct, intentional concept. Given the
Williams fact situation, it is difficult to understand how the court
could fail to visualize the strong possibility of a "bad faith motive."
Such a failure makes it an arduous task indeed to imagine a factual
32

Cases cited note 12 supra, for reference to specific intent.

33 281 F. Supp. at 177.
34

277 F. Supp. 864 (N.D. Il. 1967).

35

Id. at 872.

1970]

NO TES

249

setting in which there will be a "bad faith motive" constituting a valid
claim under the Statute.
While it is understandable that mere negligence will not constitute
a deprivation of constitutionally protected rights in a prison situation,
the distinction between the affirmative action of a prison official and
inaction, which under certain circumstances amounts to affirmative action, is a tenuous one and should be abolished. The "bad faith motive"
test is a reasonable solution to this significant problem, but one would
hope to see a more meaningful interpretation of it than was found in
the Williams case.

